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Abstract—In this paper, we propose the implementation of
multiple defect-tolerant techniques on an SRAM-based FPGA.
These techniques include redundancy at both the logic block
and intra-cluster interconnect. In the logic block, redundancy is
implemented at the multiplexer level. Its efficiency is analyzed
by injecting a single defect at the output of a multiplexer,
considering all possible locations and input combinations. While
at the interconnect level, fine grain redundancy is introduced
which not only bypasses defects but also increases routability.
Taking advantage of the sparse intra-cluster interconnect struc-
tures, routability is further improved by efficient distribution of
feedback paths allowing more flexibility in the connections among
logic blocks. Emulation results show a significant improvement of
about 15% and 34% in the robustness of logic block and intra-
cluster interconnect respectively. Furthermore, the impact of
these hardening schemes on the testability of the FPGA cluster for
manufacturing defects is also investigated in terms of maximum
achievable fault coverage and the respective cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing integration density according to Moore’s law
is being slowed due to economic and physical limits. As yield
goes down, one of the future challenges is to find a way to
use a maximum of fabricated circuits while tolerating physical
defects spread all over the chip. With respect to the defect
tolerance, FPGAs have attained a central focus due to their
reconfigurability which enables to bypass the defective areas
and implement the application on defect-free resources. In the
technical literature, there are several techniques for repairing
FPGAs when they are affected by permanent faults. Most
of these hardening schemes resort to redundancy and can be
classified into software-based and hardware-based techniques.
Software-based techniques avoid defective resources by means
of place-and-route tools which map around the defects [1].
Hence, the efficiency of the software approaches rely on
the performance of such tools. Hardware-based techniques
employ modifications in the basic architecture. In some cases,
extra hardware resources are added, providing redundancy at
different granularity levels. While in some cases, architecture
optimization is done to automate the configuration bits shift
mechanism [2].
Mesh architectures are the most common in academic [3]
and commercial FPGAs [4], because of the simplicity of
their physical layout. Logic blocks are typically arranged in
a grid and are surrounded by horizontal and vertical routing
channels. The routing fabric consists of wiring segments and
programmable switches organized into rows and columns.
The set of switches used to connect a logic block to an
adjacent routing channel is called a connection block. Most
of the FPGA area is occupied by routing resources whose
programmable switches increase the signal propagation delay
[5]. Hence, in order to reduce the interconnect resources,
modern FPGAs gather logic blocks into clusters [6]. Moreover,
the cluster interconnect structure can be depopulated by using
sparse rather than full crossbars [7]. Connection blocks can be
avoided by connecting clusters directly to switch boxes [8].
In [9], we present a mesh of clusters FPGA, where a
depopulated cluster is directly connected to the surrounding
switch boxes. We take this cluster as a reference and the
starting point of all the studies that will be undertaken in this
paper, as it combines all the aforementioned possibilities of
reducing the FPGA interconnect network.
In this paper, we present different defect-tolerant schemes
applied at different levels in the cluster of a mesh FPGA. These
defect-tolerant schemes are classified as logic and intra-cluster
interconnect level redundancy. At the logic level, an exclusive
Butterfly design is incorporated which involves the modifi-
cation of basic Look-Up Table (LUT), whereas the schemes
applied at intra-cluster interconnect incur redundancy at a wire
as well as switch level of the crossbar structure. The main
goal is to analyze these schemes with respect to the degree of
their defect tolerance and their impact on the routability and
testability of the cluster architecture. Results are produced for
the FPGA cluster enriched with each scheme separately as well
as for all the schemes applied simultaneously on the cluster.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes the hardening techniques we used to increase the
cluster robustness and routability. Emulation/simulation results
for defect tolerance, routability and testability are presented in
section III. Finally, conclusion is drawn in Section IV.
II. HARDENING THE CLUSTER
A. Redundancy in the logic blocks
We adopted the architecture called Butterfly in its modified
version described in [10]. Such architecture is more robust
than the conventional LUT, and requires a TMR voter after
the last stage of Mux2s. We used the TMR voter introduced
in [11], which is tolerant to single faults.
B. Redundancy in the interconnect blocks
1) Fine-Grain Redundancy (FGR): In this work, we use
the Fine-Grain Redundancy (FGR) introduced in [12] at the
intra-cluster interconnect.
In the crossbars ‘Up’ and ‘Down’, four levels of Mux2s are
added: two levels of upstream Mux2s to avoid the defect by
shifting the signal, and two other downstream levels to restore
the signal. Figure 1 depicts a crossbar ‘Down’ hardened with
FGR technique. The crossed Mux2 in the figure represents a
defective Mux2. It was meant to connect the input I5 to the
output O8. The upstream FGR allows to re-route the I5 signal
to the neighbouring Mux2. Then, the downstream FGR allows
to restore the signal that will be connected to O8. Nonetheless,
the I5 signal can be re-routed only if the neighbouring Mux2
is a spare resource.
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Fig. 1: Crossbar ‘Down’ hardened with FGR technique
2) Distributed Feedbacks (DF): Among the cluster’s twelve
outputs, eight are fedback in pairs to the ‘Down’ linking block
(the four crossbars ‘Down’), and the four other outputs (drawn
in thick blue line in Fig. 2) are fedback to all crossbars ‘Down’.
We call them Distributed Feedbacks (DF).
In fact, in the initial cluster architecture, if a feedback signal
happens to be routed by a defective Mux2 in the crossbar
‘Down’, the connection will not be possible. However, with
the DF technique, the connection can be made via another
Crossbar ‘Down’. That is how a defect can be bypassed.
Thanks to the DF technique, the possibility to route the same
signal is multiplied by 4. As a result, the number of inputs
per crossbar ‘Down’ increases, as well as the size of all
multiplexers.
Like in the aforementioned FGR approach, a defect map is
required to bypass the defects. While configuring the FPGA,
the defective Mux2s inside the crossbar ‘Down’ are bypassed
and all the feedbacks are routed to the other defect-free Mux2s.
The DF method is focused on the improvement of connectivity
within a cluster between logic blocks.
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Fig. 2: Structure of a mesh cluster with Distributed Feedbacks
III. DEFECT TOLERANCE, ROUTABILITY AND
TESTABILITY OF THE CLUSTER
In this section, the impact of the aforementioned techniques
on the defect tolerance, routability and testability of the cluster
is presented. Moreover, similar results for a cluster combinedly
enriched with all these techniques are also analyzed.
Two assumptions were considered througout the analyses.
First, the cluster inputs are fault-free, since our target is
to analyze the cluster’s inherent defect tolerance. Second,
configuration memory is protected against defects by using
error detecting/correcting codes [13].
The designs under study are: the cluster architecture as de-
scribed in [9] (initial version), the one enriched with Butterfly
CLBs in the logic block, the one enriched with FGR in the
‘Down’ and ‘Up’ linking blocks, the one enriched with DF,
and the one enriched with all hardening techniques mentioned
above.
A. Defect tolerance
Defect tolerance is referred to the design’s inherent robust-
ness against a defect. As a matter of fact, for some input
conditions, failures caused by a defect within the cluster appear
in a non-sensitized path and thus can not propagate to the
output. This phenomenon is referred to as logical masking. As
a robustness metric for our study, we resort to logical masking.
1) Methodology: A defect is modeled by a stuck-at 0/1 at
the output of a Mux2, and any Mux2 in the CLBs or crossbars
can be defective. Fault injection is achieved through a platform
that considers all possible input combinations and all possible
locations of a single defect in a given design. Actually, the
platform returns the number of logical maskings. To get the
logical masking rates, the number of logical maskings is
normalized by the total number of tests.
2) Emulation results: Table I shows the emulation results in
terms of logical masking rates for all the cluster architectures
explored in this work. It is worth noting that the use of
the Butterfly structure rendered the cluster CLBs completely
TABLE I: Logical masking emulation results.
Cluster
architecture
Logical masking per block(%)
‘Down’ Logic ‘Up’
Initial 100 85.33 55.55
With Butterfly 100 100 55.55
With FGR 100 85.33 84.21
With DF 100 85.33 55.55
With Butterfly, FGR and DF 100 100 84.21
TABLE II: Defect avoidance and routability results.
Cluster
Architecture
Total
of
Mux2s
Number
of
bypassed
Mux2s
Increase
of
cluster
area
(%)
Routable
with
one
defect
Initial 588 0 0 NO
With DF 708 33 20.4 YES
With FGR 784 36 33.3 YES
With FGR and DF 928 77 57.8 YES
tolerant to single defects. And thanks to the use of FGR in
the interconnect blocks, logical masking rate was increased by
roughly 30%.
Combining both hardening techniques enables to take ad-
vantage of the two gains in logical masking, but at the expense
of area overhead. Indeed, employing FGR in the ‘Down’
linking block is seemingly pointless as long as the ‘Down’
crossbars are already 100% robust against single defects.
And the same remark can be made for the DF technique.
Nevertheless, FGR in the ‘Down’ linking block is useful from
a routability and defect bypassing viewpoint. So is the DF
technique. This will be explained in the next subsection.
B. Routability and Defect avoidance
Routability of an FPGA is defined by the number of routing
solutions it offers for an application to be mapped on it. Higher
routability makes it easier to bypass the defects by providing
spare resources.
1) Methodology: A defect, modeled by an Undefined value
at the Mux2 output in Modelsim, is injected within the
crossbar ‘Down’, which makes the cluster unusable. Then,
the cluster is reconfigured to use either spare connections
inside the defective crossbar thanks to FGR or another crossbar
‘Down’ thanks to DF. Hence, the defective Mux2 is bypassed
and the cluster functionality is restored.
Since the inner architecture of the logic blocks has no im-
pact on routability and defect avoidance, it is useless analyzing
the Butterfly structure in this subsection.
2) Simulation results: Table II shows the maximum number
of defective Mux2s that can be bypassed for each cluster
design and the area overhead with respect to the initial
architecture.
As far as the architecture with DF is concerned, it is possible
to increase the number of distributed feedbacks but this would
increase the cluster area by more than 20.4%. Moreover, it is
worth noticing that DF and FGR allow to bypass virtually the
Fig. 3: Comparison of fault coverage for the cluster with
Butterfly, FGR and DF
same number of Mux2s (33 for the DF versus 36 for the FGR
which represents a gain of only 0.5% in the overall cluster).
However, FGR causes about 13% of additional area overhead
as compared to DF. Thus, if solely one hardening technique
had to be used in the interconnect blocks, one would elect the
DF over the FGR.
DF and FGR techniques can be used together in the cluster
which allows to bypass 77 Mux2s, that is more than the sum
of bypassed Mux2s in the architectures using either FGR (36
bypassed Mux2s) or DF (33 bypassed Mux2s), but the cluster
area is then increased by more than the sum of the overheads.
C. Testability
To scale the efficiency and performance of the defect toler-
ant schemes, testability of the given architectures is calculated
in terms of fault coverage which is defined as a ratio between
detected faults and the total number of potential faults in the
given circuit. The other metrics of testability include test time
and the number of corresponding test vectors.
1) Methodology: To analyze the testability aspects of the
cluster architecture, internal scan design is utilized which is the
most popular Design For Testability (DFT) technique [14]. To
incorporate the testing mechanism in the cluster architectures,
multiplexed Flip-Flop scan style is used and single scan chain
is inserted which serially connects all CLBs of the cluster.
In this experiment, metrics of testability such as fault cov-
erage and test cost are determined for each cluster architecture
using an Automatic Test Pattern Generation (ATPG) tool.
To generate the test patterns, deterministic algorithm is used
which is based on path sensitization mechanism in which a
vector is generated and a complete set of faults on the path
activated by this vector is detected. In our case, it requires a
sequence of test vectors to activate and propagate the targeted
fault in sequential logic. However, it is assumed that for a
particular test vector, no other fault masks the targeted fault
such that it cannot be detected.
2) Simulation results: The effect of each hardening tech-
nique on the testability of the cluster is analyzed. For this
purpose, stuck-at fault model is considered to determine the
test and fault coverage. Faults are injected at gate level and
the metrics of testability are measured for dominant faults.
TABLE III: Testability metrics.
Cluster
Architecture
Fault
coverage
(%)
Number
of
test
patterns
Test
cycles
Initial 97.99 808 10517
With FGR 99.52 923 12012
With DF 98.82 858 11167
With Butterfly 83.68 898 11697
With Butterfly, FGR and DF 78.22 761 9906
Figure 3 depicts a comparison of the fault coverage and the
respective test cost attained for different cluster architectures
considered in this paper. In the plot, fault coverage curves
of FGR and DF techniques shot up at the beginning as the
large number of faults are detected with a fewer number of
test patterns, thanks to the deterministic algorithm of pattern
generator. Later on, the ratio of the number of detected faults
to the number of required test patterns decreases which gives
a relatively slower increase in fault coverage. In other words,
for a limited period of test time, high density of detected faults
at the beginning is favourable.
FGR and DF, both techniques give considerably high fault
coverage. However, FGR dominates if test cost and robustness
is taken into consideration. Table III shows the summary of
the testability metrics for each hardening technique where
the maximum achievable fault coverage and the respective
number of required test patterns are given. Although feedback
paths make fault detection costly in terms of computational
time for test pattern generation as well as the number of
required test patterns, DF technique gives a better trade-off in
terms of testability. For approximately the same fault coverage,
DF costs 7% less test time as compared to FGR. The main
reason for this concession is the addition of potential nodes
and devices in case of FGR which dramatically increases the
number of faulty sites. The reason for the lower fault coverage
in case of BF is the requirement of high computational effort
to generate effective test patterns such that faults at the LUT
can be propagated through the complex Butterfly structure,
which in turn requires large number of test cycles for relatively
lower number of injected faults as compared to DF or FGR.
Similar is the case with architecture where all above mentioned
hardening schemes are combined.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presents different defect-tolerant schemes aiming
at different levels in the cluster of an FPGA. At logic level,
Butterfly design is used to enhance the logical masking up to
100% at the expense of 21% increase in cluster area and about
14% reduction in testability whereas, at the intra-cluster inter-
connect level, Fine Grain Redundancy (FGR) and Distributed
Feedback (DF) schemes are applied. Results have shown that
FGR at intra-cluster interconnect improves logical masking
to about 84% and testability to 99.5% respectively, giving
an increment of 33.3% and 12.5% in cluster area and test
cost respectively. DF does not improve any logical masking.
However, increase in routability improves the testability to
98.8% at the cost of 5.8% as compared to the initial cluster
architecture. By combining all the defect-tolerant schemes (BF
at logic, DF and FGR at interconnect level), the cluster can be
made more robust to the permanent faults as it gathers all the
pros of logical masking but at the expense of area overhead
of 78.23% and testability degradation of 21%.
Future work includes the analysis of defect tolerance for
switch box of the FPGA along with the cluster. We plan to
extend this study for multiple manufacturing defects using
other models like bridging and delay faults.
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